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Abstract We take a new look at electoral sectionalism and dynamic nationalization in pres-
idential elections. We treat this problem as one of synchronism of electoral cycles, which we
estimate by using wavelets. After providing a self-contained introduction to wavelet anal-
ysis, we use it to assess the degree and the dynamics of electoral synchronization in the
United States. We determine clusters of states where electoral swings have been more and
less in sync with each other and with the national cycle. Then, we analyze how the degree
of synchronism of electoral cycles has changed through time, answering questions as to
when, to what extent, and where has a tendency towards a “universality of political trends”
in presidential elections been more strongly felt. We present evidence strongly in favor of
an increase in the dynamic nationalization of presidential elections taking place since the
1950s, largely associated with a convergence in most (but not all) Southern states.
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1 Introduction
Half a century ago, E.E. Schattschneider noted an important change that seemed to be taking
place in presidential electoral politics in the United States: since the 1950s, large majorities
of the vote for one party or another in any state had become increasingly rare events, and a
trend towards the “universality of political trends” was taking hold, through which swings
from one election to the next were reflected in an increasingly uniform way across states
(Schattschneider 1960: 90–93). Since then, the notion that presidential politics have be-
come “nationalized” seems to have taken hold.1 Studies have confirmed the much greater
strength of national forces in presidential elections when compared with congressional elec-
tions (Vertz et al. 1987), the rising uniformity of swings across states from one election to
the other (Schantz 1992), and the rise of national forces driving presidential election returns
(Bartels 1998).
At the same time, however, one of the most recurrent findings in the study of spatial
patterns in American presidential elections is the persistence of a regionally-based section-
alism. In the context of the study of presidential elections, scholars concerned with this
perennial problem (Turner 1914, 1926) have detected a sustained geographic preponderance
of one party or another. Using the techniques of quantitative geography (Murray 2010),
including factor, K-means clustering, and spatial autocorrelation analyses, researchers have
confirmed, particularly since the pioneering work of Archer and Taylor (1981), the existence
of regions characterized by the electoral preponderance of one of the parties (Republicans or
Democrats) or, conversely, by a relative balance between them.2 These and other spatial pat-
terns have been explained not only as a result of the fundamental organization of presidential
elections (the state-by-state organization of the Electoral College—Clotfelter and Vavrichek
1980) but also as resulting from variations between regions in terms of political cultures
(Elazar 1994), fundamental economic features (Agnew 1987), or levels of social and eth-
nic diversity (Hero 1998). Finally, their persistence has been interpreted as evidence against
the notion that some sort of growing homogeneity in electoral behavior is occurring in the
United States: the resilience of this sort of sectionalism “questions (. . . ) the nationalization
thesis” and reveals that “political regionalism is a contemporary and historical feature of the
American landscape” (Heppen 2003: 191, 203).
The coexistence of these two apparently different diagnostics should remind us that the
concept of “nationalization of politics” encompasses two different dimensions. The first is
what Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale (1984: 81–82) described as “convergence of parti-
san support”, i.e., “the increasing similarity of geographic units” in terms of electoral sup-
port for the two parties, or what Morgenstern, Swindle, and Castagnola (2009: 1322) call
“static/distributional nationalization,” “the consistency of a party’s support across a country
at a particular point in time.” However, there is a second dimension of the “nationalization
of politics”: “uniform response” (Claggett et al. 1984: 81–82) or “dynamic nationalization”
(Morgenstern et al. 2009: 1322). Regardless of how partisan support remains distributed
across different territorial sub-units, it is also important to know whether swings from one
election to another take place uniformly (or not) across the country. It is therefore possible
1To be sure, this diagnostic is less clear in what concerns congressional elections, considering the uncertainty
about the actual size of incumbency effects, “presidential coattails”, or the causes behind the emergence
of quality challengers in congressional elections. See, for example, Stokes (1967), Claggett et al. (1984),
Kawato (1987), Brady et al. (2000), and Morgenstern et al. (2009). For a recent discussion of national forces
in congressional elections, see Burden and Wichowsky (2010).
2See also Archer and Shelley (1986), Shelley et al. (1996), and Heppen (2003).
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that, while nationalization may increase from a “dynamic” point of view, sectionalism may
persist from a “distributional” point of view.
This paper, however, calls attention to another way in which “nationalization” and “sec-
tionalism” may coexist: the existence of sectional patterns in dynamic nationalization itself.
By applying the tools of wavelet analysis to the national and state presidential election re-
turns, we can, first, ascertain the degree to which electoral change at the national and state
level has been synchronized since the beginning of the 20th century and the extent to which
such synchronism has increased or decreased. Furthermore, this methodology will allow us
not only a fine-grained analysis of the extent to which each of the states have been syn-
chronized with electoral change at the national level, but also, most crucially, the detection
of sectional patterns in this dynamic nationalization, by determining particular clusters of
states that have remained detached or moved closer both to the national elections’ and to
each other’s electoral cycles. In other words, unlike what most of the literature concerned
with regional sectionalism has done so far, we can look for and detect spatial patterns, not
on the level of support historically awarded by different states to different parties, but rather
on the degree of uniformity of electoral change the states have displayed through time.
Finally, our analysis sheds further light on both when and how a general increase in the
“universality of political trends” may have taken place. Schattschneider argued that the New
Deal had been a crucial, but only a first step, in a change in the agenda of American politics.
Comparing the directionality of electoral swings in the states and detecting the 1950s as a
turning point in this respect, he concluded that the New Deal’s change in public policy—“the
greatest in American history”—“was in its turn swamped a decade later by an even greater
revolution in foreign policy arising from World War II and the Cold War.” It was only the
cumulative effect of these events that modified the nature of party alternatives and created a
national political alignment that replaced the previous sectional alignment (Schattschneider
1960: 89). Others, however, suggest different timings and even trends. Schantz (1992), for
example, argues that the major shift in this respect took place from 1928 to 1936, after which
the mean deviation between swings in different groups of states and the national swing
remained stable and at low levels. Bartels (1998: 285), albeit finding that the contemporary
period was one of “unprecedented nationalization,” finds “the magnitude of national forces
increasing markedly over the first three decades of the 20th century, reaching a peak at
the beginning of the New Deal era,” and that the relative magnitude of national and sub-
national forces actually tipped “towards sub-national forces during the racial sorting-out of
the 1950s and 1960s.” In this paper, we revisit this discussion, using the cross-wavelet and
phase-difference tools provided by wavelet analysis to determine when the increase in the
synchronization of electoral cycles occurred and the states that contributed the most to that
overall trend.
The study is structured as follows. In section two, we introduce the tools of wavelet
analysis. With already broad usage in the physical and biological sciences, wavelet analy-
sis is becoming recognized as a standard econometric tool (Crowley 2007; Aguiar-Conraria
et al. 2012b; Kennedy 2008; Aguiar-Conraria and Soares 2011; Gallegati et al. 2011; Rua
2012). However, other than in economics, and to the best of our knowledge, wavelet analysis
has never—with the single exception of Aguiar-Conraria et al. (2012a)—been used in other
social sciences. We go further than the previous political science application of wavelet anal-
ysis by introducing the wavelet spectral distance matrix, which allows us, in section three,
to compute distances for each pair of states and between each state and the United States
in terms of the main features of their electoral cycles and to look into the spatial patterns
of this synchronism, detecting clusters of states that, throughout American electoral history,
have displayed more similar or dissimilar behaviors in terms of electoral change through
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time. In section four, we approach the issue of the strengthening dynamic nationalization of
presidential elections with the help of cross-wavelet and phase-difference tools, addressing
the issue of when did a trend towards increasing uniformity of electoral change across the
United States begin to take hold.
2 Electoral cycles and wavelet analysis
Our starting point is the notion that electoral change in the United States has exhibited
cyclical features. To be sure, a number of critiques of “realignment theory” have debunked
the notion that presidential election returns are characterized by abrupt and rigidly periodic
changes from one party to another (Lichtman 1976; Bartels 1998; Mayhew 2002). However,
once we stay away from the notion of “critical elections,” there is considerable evidence
that election returns have displayed, at least since the late 19th century and at the national
level, some sort of pendularity, in which the share of the vote for the major parties has ebbed
and flowed in a fairly regular manner. Although controversy remains concerning the actual
periodicity of those cycles and their prevalence throughout the entire American electoral
history, empirical support for some sort of cyclicality has been shown robust to the use of
a variety of techniques (Norpoth 1995; Lin and Guillén 1998; Merrill et al. 2008; Aguiar-
Conraria et al. 2012a).
From this starting point, the issue of dynamic nationalization in presidential elections
can be framed in terms of the synchronization of electoral cycles both across territorial sub-
units and between those sub-units and what happens at the national level. If the overall
variances in the time series of election returns in different sub-units are explained by similar
predominant cycles, if there is coherence in time and predominant frequency between those
time series, and if those oscillations in electoral support are synchronized, then one would
be observing uniformity in electoral swings, i.e., “dynamic nationalization.” The challenge
is to devise a way to estimate the fundamental properties of these time series and to devise
a metric that allows us to measure their similarity and dissimilarity and how it has evolved
with time. We argue that wavelet analysis is particularly well-suited for this task.
Like Fourier spectral analysis, wavelet analysis allows us to determine whether cycles
of a particular length play predominant roles in explaining the overall variance of a time-
series. Unlike Fourier spectral analysis, wavelet analysis reveals how the different periodic
components evolve over time. In this section, we present a rigorous intuitive introduction to
wavelet analysis. For a technically demanding text, the reader may consult Aguiar-Conraria
and Soares (2013, forthcoming). One paper that we found useful when we started working
on wavelets is the one by Cazelles et al. (2008).
2.1 Wavelets and the time frequency analysis of cycles
The theory behind Fourier analysis can be traced back to 1807, when Joseph Fourier showed
that almost any periodic function could be written as a weighted sum of sines and cosines
of different frequencies. Even if the function is not periodic, under some conditions, it still
may be expressed as an integral of sines and cosines multiplied by a weighting function. In
studying cycles, a sensible approach is to map the original variable, say x(t), into the fre-
quency domain, by means of the Fourier transform. Fourier spectral analysis has been used
to estimate which cycles play predominant roles in explaining the variance of a time series.
E.g., Merrill et al. (2008) relied on this technique to conclude that there was a predominant
cycle in the North American national elections with a period of about 26 years.
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Fig. 1 A wavelet and a cosine function









cos(ωt) − i sin(ωt)]dt, (1)
where i = √−1 is the imaginary or complex unit.3 The main limitation of Fourier analysis is
apparent in the above formula, where X is a function only of ω, the frequency, implying that
the information about time is lost under the Fourier transform. This is the main advantage
of wavelet analysis: its ability to provide information simultaneously in the time and in the
frequency domains.
The minimum requirements imposed on a function to be called a wavelet involve a cer-
tain technical condition (known as the admissibility condition); for practical applications,
however, a wavelet ψ must be a function with finite energy (analogous to require that its
variance is bounded),4 well-localized in time (i.e., have fast decay towards zero) and have
zero mean (which means that the function has to wiggle up and down around zero). This is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Consider a variable x(t) and a wavelet function ψ , possibly complex. The continuous














where the bar denotes complex conjugation.6 The wavelet transform maps the variable into
the time-scale domain. Parameter τ is a translation parameter controlling the location of
the wavelet (in time). Parameter s is a scaling or dilation factor that controls the width
of the wavelet; increasing s stretches it into a long wavelet function to measure long-run
cycles (low frequency) while decreasing s compresses it to measure short-run cycles (high
frequency). We say that the wavelet analysis is performed in the time-frequency domain
3It should be observed that there are different conventions in the definition of Fourier transform; with the
above convention, ω is an angular (or radian) frequency. The relation to the more common Fourier frequency
f is given by ω = 2πf .
4This means that ‖ψ(t)‖2 = ∫ ∞−∞ |ψ(t)|2dt < ∞. Usually, ψ(t) is normalized so that ‖ψ(t)‖ = 1.
5There is also the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT), with which we will not deal. For an introduction to
the DWT, the reader is referred to Crowley (2007).
6The conjugate of a complex number, a + bi, is simply a − bi. If a number is real, then the conjugate is the
number itself. Therefore, this distinction is relevant only in the case of a complex wavelet.
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because there is a biunivocal (inverse) relation between scales and frequencies, and both
terms can be used interchangeably.
2.2 The wavelet choice and its localization properties
Looking at Eq. (2), it should be clear that the wavelet transform is an amalgam of the orig-
inal variable, x(t), and the wavelet, ψ . Therefore, one must be careful with the wavelet
choice. Several wavelet functions with different characteristics are available, such as the
Paul, Daubechies, Haar and Cauchy. Some of them have nice names, like the Mexican hat,
in honor of its characteristic shape.
When one is interested in studying the oscillatory behavior of a variable, it is almost
mandatory to use a complex wavelet. To see this, note that, when we use a complex wavelet,
Wx(τ, s) is a complex number that can be separated in its amplitude, |Wx(τ, s)|, and phase
(or phase angle), ϕx(τ, s): Wx(τ, s) = |Wx(τ, s)|eiϕx (τ,s). The phase yields important infor-
mation about the position of the variable in the cycle. We will explore this notion later, when
we discuss the phase-difference.





2 = π− 14 [cos(ω0t) + i sin(ω0t)]e− t22 , (3)
where ω0 is a localization parameter in the frequency domain. There are good reasons for
the Morlet wavelet to be so popular. First, with the Morlet wavelet, the functions used in the
analysis are given (essentially) by sines and cosines just like with the Fourier analysis. The
main difference is the Morlet wavelet becomes a well-localized function by multiplication
by a standardized Gaussian density function for t . Because of this, the concepts of frequency
of the Fourier analysis and frequency of wavelet analysis are similar. This is a plus, espe-
cially because social scientists are more familiar with Fourier analysis. The wavelet in Fig. 1
is the real part of the Morlet wavelet, with ω0 = 6.7
Second, the Morlet wavelet has optimal joint time-frequency localization in the following
sense. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle states that certain pairs of physical properties
cannot simultaneously be known to arbitrarily high precision. In our context, precision in
frequency implies less precision in time. The Morlet wavelet reaches Heisenbergian uncer-
tainty’s theoretical lower bound. Moreover, it also reaches the best possible compromise
between time and frequency accuracy.8
2.3 The wavelet power spectrum: a fake and a real application
In analogy with the Fourier power spectrum, the wavelet power spectrum is defined as
WPSx(τ, s) =
∣∣Wx(τ, s)∣∣2. (4)
7Although, strictly speaking, the Morlet function defined by (3) is not a “true” wavelet, since it has no zero
mean, in practice, it can still be considered as a wavelet, provided that the parameter ω0 is sufficiently large
(e.g., ω0 > 5). The case ω0 = 6 is the most common choice. This is so essentially because for this value, the
wavelet can be considered to be a function of angular frequency ω0 = 6 (normal frequency f = 6/2π ≈ 1)
and, when scaled by s, it becomes a function of frequency f ≈ 1/s. Therefore, for this parameter choice
conversion from wavelet scales (s) to frequencies is almost immediate.
8Let μt and σt and μω and σω be the mean and standard deviation of the probability density functions de-
fined by |ψ(t)|2/‖ψ(t)‖ and by |Ψ (ω)|2/‖|Ψ (ω)|‖2, respectively, where Ψ (ω) is the Fourier transform of
ψ(t). The most significant values of ψ(t) and Ψ (ω) are attained in the so-called Heisenberg box: Hψ =
[μt − σt ,μt + σt ] × [μω − σω,μω − σω]. We say that ψ is localized around the point (μt ,μω) with uncer-
tainty given by σt σω . The Heisenberg uncertainty principle establishes that σt σω ≥ 1/2. Moreover, for the
Morlet wavelet, one has that σt = σω = 1√2 , meaning that accuracy in time and in frequency are similar.
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Fig. 2 Wavelet analysis of oscillatory signals with two period components. Series xt is characterized by a
five-year cycle that, abruptly, changes to a 10-year cycle at observation 51. Series yt is characterized by a
five-year cycle in the first 35 observations and a 10-year cycle in the last 30 observations. In between, the
cycle gradually changes its periodicity from five to ten. In (a.2) and (b.2) we estimate the Fourier power
spectrum of xt and yt . In (a.3) and (b.3) we estimate the wavelet power spectrum of xt and yt (Color figure
online)
This gives us a measure of the variance distribution of the time series in the time-
frequency plane.
To illustrate how the wavelet power spectrum differs from the Fourier power spectrum,
consider two variables that we construct: xt and yt . Assuming that the data are annual,
both are characterized by two cycles: one with a periodicity of five years and the other
with a periodicity of ten years. However, while for xt this change is abrupt, and occurs
at observation 51, for yt the change is gradual, slowly evolving from observation 36 until
observation 71, when it becomes a 10-year cycle.9
In Fig. 2, these series, as well as their Fourier power spectrum and their WPS, are repre-
sented. In the pictures with the Fourier power spectrum (a.2 and b.2), the two main cycles
are well identified; however the picture completely misses the dynamics of the cycles. From
the power spectrum, it is impossible to know the period in which each cycle was preva-
lent as well as identify when the change occurred and if it was abrupt or smooth. Notice
that, in both cases, the Fourier power spectrum yields basically the same estimation. In one
sentence: time information is lost.
In the bottom, we have the wavelet power spectra. We have time on in the horizontal
axis and frequency—converted into cycle periods—on the vertical axis. The value of the
wavelet power spectrum is captured by colors. Cold colors correspond to low power, indi-
9We have written a wavelet toolbox in Matlab. The toolbox, all of the data and codes can be at https://sites.
google.com/site/aguiarconraria/joanasoares-wavelets. All of the data and codes used can be found there. The
toolbox is quite user-friendly and comes with several examples and a quick user’s guide.
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Fig. 3 The wavelet power
spectrum of the Democratic share
of the vote in presidential
elections (Color figure online)
cating low volatility at the specified time and frequency, while warm colors correspond to
regions of high power. The colors range from blue to red. The black contour indicates 5 %
significance10 and the faded black lines capture the cone of influence (COI), indicating the
region affected by edge effects.11 The white lines show the local maxima of the wavelet
power spectrum. Had we relied on three-dimensional graphs, instead of colors, these would
correspond to the peaks of the mountains.
In both cases, the wavelet power spectrum captures quite well the dynamics of the cycles.
In the first case, the abrupt change is perfectly clear, with the red region moving abruptly
from period five to period 10. In the second case, this change is gradual.
Basically, while the Fourier transform is silent about changes that happen across time,
with wavelets we estimate the power spectrum as a function of time and, therefore, we are
able to simultaneously identify the period of the most important cycles as well as their dates.
Figure 3, taken from Aguiar-Conraria et al. (2012a), displays the wavelet power spectrum
for the Democratic share of the two-party vote from 1856 to 2008 in presidential elections.12
By applying wavelet analysis to American national presidential electoral returns, the authors
showed that the predominant cycles that had been identified in previous studies were in fact
transient, failing to characterize the entire period under examination.
This picture reveals the existence of the 26/27-year cycle identified earlier by Lin and
Guillén (1998) and Merrill et al. (2008), but also that such a cycle is localized temporally
starting at the turn of the 20th century but dissipating by the end of the 1960s. Furthermore,
it shows a transitional 14-year cycle between the late 1950s and 1980, as well as (weak,
statistically not significant) evidence of the coexistence of these cycles with a long cycle of
60 years.
10To perform significance tests of wavelet measures, we fit an AR(1) model and construct new samples by
drawing errors from a Gaussian distribution with a variance equal to that of the estimated error terms. For
each time series (or pair of time series) we perform the exercise 5000 times, and then extract the critical
values.
11As with other types of transforms, the CWT applied to a finite length time series suffers from border
distortions due to the fact that the values of the transform at the beginning and the end of the time series
involve missing values of the series which are artificially prescribed. In this area, the results have to be
interpreted carefully.
12All data used in this paper were provided by the American Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara (http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu).
Public Choice (2013) 156:387–408 395
2.4 The cross wavelet transform and the phase-difference
So far, we have seen only how to analyze a single time series. However, with wavelet analysis
one also has the ability to deal with the time-frequency dependencies between two time
series.13 This is allowed by using the concepts of cross wavelet power, wavelet coherency,
and phase-difference, which are natural generalizations of the basic wavelet analysis tools.
The cross-wavelet transform of two time series, x(t) and y(t), is defined as Wxy(τ, s) =
Wx(τ, s)W̄y(τ, s). The cross-wavelet power of two time series, |Wx(τ, s)|, depicts the local
covariance between two time series at each time and frequency. In analogy with the concept
of coherency used in Fourier analysis, given two time series x(t) and y(t) one defines their
wavelet coherency:
Rxy(τ, s) = |S(Wxy(τ, s))|√|S(Wxx(τ, s))S(Wyy(τ, s))| , (5)
where S denotes a smoothing operator in both time and scale.14 It ranges from zero (no
coherency) to 1 (strong coherency). This quantity can be interpreted as a local correlation
coefficient in the time-frequency space.
One of the major advantages of using a complex-valued wavelet is that we can com-
pute the phase of the wavelet transform of each series and thus obtain information about
the possible delays in the oscillations of the two series as a function of time and fre-
quency, by computing the phases and the phase-difference. The phase is given by ϕx(τ, s) =






where, for a given complex number, ( ) and ( ) denote, respectively, its real part and its
imaginary part.
In our application, where the features of national and state-level election returns are com-
pared, a phase-difference of zero indicates that the time series of election returns at the na-
tional and at the state level move together at the specified frequency; between 0 and π/2,
the series move in phase, with the national electoral cycle leading the state cycle; between
−π/2 and 0, then it is the state that leads; between π/2 and π , the series are out of phase
(negatively correlated), with the state leading; and, finally, between −π and −π/2, they are
out of phase, with the national cycle leading.
For example, in Fig. 4,15 on the left, we show the wavelet coherency between the Demo-
cratic share in presidential elections in Maine and the United States as a whole. Dynamics
change both across time and frequencies. If one focuses on the cycles with periods in the
range of 22–32 years, it is obvious that a very strong coherency exists between Maine and
the rest of the nation. The phase-difference that corresponds to these frequencies, the red
line in the bottom picture on the right, is above zero (and below π/2). This tells us that the
electoral cycle in Maine lags the national cycle.
At shorter run frequencies, in 12–16 year range, we also observe a highly coherent region
between the early 1950s and early 1990s. For these years, the phase-difference (top picture
13For a generalization to several variables, see Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2013, forthcoming).
14Smoothing is necessary; otherwise, just as with Fourier coherency, it would be identically one at all scales
and times. Time and scale smoothing can be achieved, e.g., by convolution with appropriate windows.
15In Sect. 5, when these results are discussed more deeply, we also discuss our estimation choices.
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Fig. 4 On the left: wavelet coherency between Maine and the United States. The black contour designates
the 5 % significance level. The color code for coherency ranges from blue (low coherency—close to zero)
to red (high coherency—close to one). On the right: phase and phase-difference. The green line represents
the National phase, and the blue line represents the state’s phase. The red line gives us the phase-difference
between the two series (Color figure online)
on the right) is also slightly above zero, showing that electoral cycles in this state lag the
national cycles. This is an illustration of the type of information that one can extract from
the presented wavelet tools.
2.5 Distance between two wavelet transforms
For our purposes, we need to measure the dissimilarities between the wavelet transforms
of two time series, say xt and yt .16 Comparing wavelet transforms is like comparing two
images. Direct comparison is not suitable because there is no guarantee that regions of low
power will not overshadow the comparison.
We follow Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2011) and compute the Singular Value Decom-
position of the matrix WxWHy , where W
H
y is the conjugate transpose of Wy , to focus on the
common high power time-frequency regions. Because this method extracts the components
that maximize covariances, the first extracted components correspond to the most impor-
tant common patterns of the wavelet transforms. With the Singular Value Decomposition
we compute just a few vectors—the leading patterns, lkx and l
k
y ; k = 1, . . . ,K , and singular
vectors, ukx and u
k
y ; k = 1, . . . ,K , with K < F 17—which will approximately reconstruct the
original matrices: Wx ≈ ∑Kk=1 ukxlkx and Wy ≈ ∑Kk=1 ukylky .
16Note that we are comparing the wavelet transforms, and not the power spectrum. Therefore we are preserv-
ing the information given by the imaginary part.
17In this paper, we use K = 3.
Public Choice (2013) 156:387–408 397
As in Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2011), to compare the wavelet spectra between two










where σk are singular values (obtained in the SVD decomposition) and where the distance
d(u, v) between two vectors is computed by measuring the angle between each pair of cor-
responding segments, defined by the consecutive points of the two vectors, and taking the
mean of these values. This is not as trivial as it may seem, because, since we are using use
a complex wavelet, the components of leading vectors and leading patterns are complex
numbers. Therefore, we need to define an angle in a complex vector space, for which there
is no mathematical consensus. There are two reasonable approaches, one using the Hermi-
tian angle, the other using an extension of the Euclidean angle. We will use the Hermitian
approach.18 Using the Euclidean would deliver similar results, except where noted.
We now can use these tools to examine elections in the states, determining the cyclicality
of election returns in each one (with the wavelet power spectra), comparing it state to state
and between each state and the national outcomes (with the wavelet spectral distances as
described in this section), determining with cluster analysis what sets of states exhibit most
similar cyclicality, and, finally, use the cross-wavelet and phase-difference tools to look
at the timing of closer synchronization among states. This is what we do in the next two
sections.
3 The geography of electoral cycles
That there is a geography of the distribution of party support in presidential elections is, by
now, relatively well established in the literature. But what can we say about the geography
of electoral change? What clusters of states emerge when we look for the synchronicity of
their electoral cycles, both with the national cycle identified in Fig. 3 and among each other?
We use data for 45 states from 1896 until 2008,19 and compute the Democratic share of
the two-party vote for all 29 presidential elections in all those states.20 Figure A1, which
can be consulted in an online appendix,21 shows the continuous wavelet power spectra of
18For the mathematically oriented researcher: consider two complex vectors, a and b. Define the Hermitian
inner product, 〈a, b〉C = aH b and the corresponding norm, ‖a‖ =
√〈a, a〉C . The Hermitian angle, ΘH ,
between a and b is obtained by the formula cos(ΘH ) = |〈a, b〉C |/(‖a‖‖b‖).
19The only excluded states are Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, as they only achieved
statehood after 1896.
20The only exception is for the 1912 presidential run. In that election, Theodore Roosevelt failed to receive
the Republican nomination. Roosevelt created the Progressive party and ran for president, dividing the Re-
publican electorate. For this individual election, we compare the votes of the Democratic candidate (Woodrow
Wilson) with the total of the votes of the other two major contenders (William Taft and Roosevelt). A more
recent case of a third party candidate receiving a large share of the vote (19 %) is Ross Perot in 1992. How-
ever, extant research shows that, rather than affecting one particular party, Perot voters would have been split
almost evenly between the candidates of the two major parties (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). More generally,
Merrill et al. (2008) show that the detection of cycles in US presidential elections is mostly insensitive to
different ways of handling third-party candidates.
21The online appendix, containing Table A1 and Figs. A1 and A2, is available at: http://sites.google.com/site/
aguiarconraria/Online_Appendix_PUCH.pdf.
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the Democratic share of the vote for the national aggregate (as in Fig. 3) and in all 45 states
considered. We assess the statistical significance against the null hypothesis of an AR(1).
Looking at the time-frequency decomposition, some interesting facts are revealed. The
persistent 27-year cycle (until the 1960s) and the transient 14-year cycle between early
1950s and 1980 that we found for the United States as a whole is closely replicated in
several states, such as, among others, Maine, Ohio, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York,
and Pennsylvania. But if these states seem to replicate the basic cyclicality found at the na-
tional level, the same does not occur with others. For example, in Tennessee, a 10–14 year
cycle is very strong between 1960 and 1990, while in Texas one can find a cycle at these
same frequencies before 1950, and so on. In sum, it is clear that the time series of presiden-
tial election returns in the different states have different properties and that not all of them
resemble closely the general ebb and flow of election results detected at the national level.
However, these sorts of visual comparisons become of little use with so much informa-
tion, and we need to find summary measures of the similarity of cycles between states and
the national aggregate. Furthermore, comparisons of wavelet power spectra may be decep-
tive, since they reveal no information about the phase.22 Therefore, even if two entities share
a similar high power region—such as, for example, the United States and, say, Virginia—
one cannot infer that their electoral cycles are alike. It is possible that, although cycles have
a similar periodicity, while in one entity the Democratic share is increasing in a particular
period, it is decreasing in other at the same time. Thus, based on formula (7) (multiplied
by 100) we compute the pairwise dissimilarity index between the wavelet spectra that char-
acterize election returns nationally and in the states. In Table 1, we show the dissimilarity
between each state’s electoral cycle and the national cycle.23
As explained in Sect. 2.5, this index takes into account both the real and the imaginary
part of the wavelet transform. A value very close to zero means that two entities have a
very similar wavelet transform. This, in turn, implies that the two entities being compared
(either state with national aggregate or state with state) share the same high power regions
and that their phases are aligned. This means that (1) the contribution of cycles at each
frequency to the total variance is similar between both states, (2) this contribution happens
at the same time in both states and, finally, (3) the ups and downs of each cycle are taking
place simultaneously in both states. In this sense, we say that a value close to zero between
entities means that their electoral cycles are highly synchronized.
Table 1 reveals that there are 24 states where we can reject, with p < 0.05, the null
hypothesis that the national cycle and the cycles in these states are not synchronized, a
number of states that extends to 33 if we relax the significance level to p < 0.10. To put
it differently, there are 12 states that, throughout the period under analysis (from 1986 to
2008), seem clearly out of sync with the national cycle. It does not take long to realize what
unit they form: they are all the eleven members of the former Confederate States of America,
plus Kentucky.
In contrast, the ten states whose electoral cycles are more aligned with the national cycle
are Ohio, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, California, Wyoming, Iowa, Connecticut,
Indiana, and North Dakota. Note again that the fact that these states have their electoral
22This is so because the phase information is obtained from the imaginary part of a complex number. How-
ever, the wavelet power spectrum is the square of an absolute value and the absolute value transforms a
complex number into a real number.
23By “national,” we mean the aggregate electoral result of the states included in our sample. When we com-
pute the distance between each state and the national aggregate defined in this way, we exclude that state from
the aggregate.
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Table 1 Dissimilarity index between the national and the states’ electoral cycle
cycles synchronized with the national cycle does not mean that the candidate who wins in
these states is the candidate who wins the country, or that the distribution of the partisan
vote has been similar to that of the national aggregate. So, for example, it may seem obvious
that a bellwether state like Ohio has closely followed the cyclicality at the national level.
However, the list of most “aligned” states also includes “red states” like Wyoming or North
Dakota, where Republican presidential candidates have won the electoral votes in all but one
presidential election since 1952 (in fact, since 1940 for North Dakota), as well as states that,
at least since the early 1990s, have been considered “safe” for Democrats (such as Maine,
New Jersey, California, or Connecticut). What they share is the fact that, in spite of this, the
swings around the mean have nevertheless been quite synchronized with what occurs at the
national level. Finally, this analysis also tells us nothing about the distribution of the vote
in the South. However, it does tell us that, contrary to what occurs in the remaining states,
there is no evidence that the national ebb and flow of election returns we showed in Fig. 3
has generally been reflected, when the broad 1896–2008 period is considered, in the old
Confederacy states.
We can also have a look at the pairwise dissimilarity between the electoral cycles in
the 45 states under analysis. However, that table (Table A1, in the online appendix) has
just too much information to be easily readable (more than 900 entries). Thus, we try to
visualize this matrix by performing some clustering analysis. We produce a hierarchical tree
clustering. The idea is to group the states according to their similarities. We follow a bottom
up approach. We start with the 45 states and group, in cluster, the two most similar states,
say C1 and C2 (New Jersey and New York, to be more precise). In the second round, states
C1 and C2 are replaced by a combination of the two, say C46. Now, one has to build a
new matrix, not only with the distance between the 44 remaining states, but also with the
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Fig. 5 Hierarchical tree clusters
distance between each state and C46 (which we consider to be the average of the individual
distances). The procedure continues until there is only one cluster with all the states.
In Fig. 5, we can see the result of this hierarchical clustering. Depending on how demand-
ing one is in the definition of a cluster, one can identify several clusters. Matlab’s default
results in partitioning the tree into three clusters. A big cluster of several states, whose elec-
toral cycles are relatively similar, emerges. Note that this cluster of states coincides exactly
with those that, in Table 1, we showed to have an electoral cycle significantly (at least at
10 % level) synchronized with the cycle of national election returns. Then, among those
states that were not synchronized with the national cycle, two additional clusters emerge
when we make pairwise comparisons. It should not be by now a surprise that, on a long-
run perspective, those two clusters would contain the Southern states. However, the results
do identify an additional cluster containing the most asynchronous electoral cycles, which
includes Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi and South Carolina, i.e., four of the five states that
comprise the traditionally defined “Deep South.”
Although suggestive, the clustering tree has some limitations that could conceivably dis-
tort the analysis. Since each state is linked solely to one other state (or cluster of states),
one may lose sight of the whole picture. An alternative approach is to use the dissimilarity
matrix as a distance matrix and map the states on a two-axis system. The idea is to reduce
the dissimilarity matrix to a two-column matrix. This new matrix, the configuration matrix,
contains the position of each state on two orthogonal axes. Therefore, we can position each
state on a two-dimensional map. This cannot be performed with perfect accuracy because
the dissimilarity matrix does not represent Euclidean distances. Its interpretation should be
ordinal. Therefore, the goal is not to reproduce the “distances” given by Table A1 on a map,
but rather to produce a map with pairwise distances that reproduce, as much as possible,
the ordering of Table A1. We use Kruskal’s (1964a, 1964b) stress algorithm and minimize
the square differences between the distances on the map and the “true distances” given in
Table 2. Figure 6 displays this map. Again, although the precise frontiers are, naturally,
somewhat arbitrary,24 it remains possible to identify three clusters of states that coincide
with the information we had extracted from the clustering tree: a set of core states; the
“Outer South”; and the “Deep South.”
In sum, these results reveal that there indeed has been a regional sectionalism in pres-
idential election returns in the United States that has so far remained mostly unnoticed in
24With the exception of the largest cluster, which, as we have seen, includes all of the states that have an
electoral cycle significantly synchronized with the national cycle.
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Fig. 6 Multidimensional scaling
map. The figure plots in a
two-dimensional scale the
dissimilarities across states
studies of quantitative political geography. Rather than being based on the historical elec-
toral preponderance of one party or another, it is a sectionalism based on the extent to which
particular regions have displayed swings from one election to another that are synchronized
both with the national cycle and with each other. We found two clusters of states that have
exhibited greater dissimilarity both from the “national” cycle and from the “core” states.
These two clusters comprise together all of the old Confederacy plus Kentucky, but are in-
ternally differentiated in such a way as to separate the Deep South (with the exception of
Louisiana) from the remaining Southern states. Kentucky is a “bordeline” case from another
perspective: had we used the Euclidean angle, rather than the Hermitian, to compute the dis-
tance, Kentucky would have appeared in the first cluster. All remaining main results would
stand.
4 The dynamics of dynamic nationalization
We can now move ahead to the second major issue at stake: has the degree of uniformity of
electoral swings in the states increased with time? Besides, armed with the tools of wavelet
analysis, we can answer an additional question: if synchronism has indeed increased, which
states contributed the most to that overall trend?
We approach this issue by using the cross wavelets and phase-difference tools. With
cross wavelets, we can estimate the coherency between cycles in different entities. Regions
of high coherency between two entities are synonymous with strong local (both in time
and frequency) correlation. Then, the phase-difference gives us information on the delay,
or synchronization, between oscillations of the two time series for a given frequency. By
estimating it, we can observe whether there are tendencies towards convergence in electoral
cycles between the states and the national aggregate, localize those tendencies in time, and
distinguish those states where convergence is observable from those where it is not. This is
a major advantage of wavelet analysis when compared with other traditional methods. If we
were using the traditional spectral analysis, we would lose the time information, making it
impossible to analyze dynamic convergence. On the other hand, if we were using traditional
time-domain methods (such as Granger causality tests), we would miss the information on
frequencies.
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Figure 7 shows, for a small sample of four states provided here as an example,25 the
coherency between the national cycle in the Democratic share of the two-party vote and the
cycle for the same share of the vote in each of those states. We also estimate the phase of the
oscillations at the national and state level, as well as their phase-difference. Given that, in
Fig. 3, we identified two main national cycles, one at the 14-year frequency and the other at
the 27-year frequency, we focus our phase-difference analysis on these cycles. So, for each
state, we calculate the average phase and phase-difference for the 12–16 and for the 22–32
frequency bands.
We can immediately appreciate some interesting dynamics in these four illustrative cases.
For example, South Carolina, like the other states we identified early on as belonging to the
Deep South’s most peripheral cluster—Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi—shows, as could
be expected, very few regions of high coherence with the national cycle. Furthermore, the
phase-difference shows that South Carolina’s electoral cycle, besides not being aligned with
the rest of the country, also exhibits no tendency to converge with the national cycle. If
anything, as time goes by, South Carolina’s electoral cycle, as well as those of the other
states in this Deep South cluster (see Fig. A2 in the online appendix) is diverging more and
more.
In contrast, if we focus on North Carolina, as well as on the “Outer South” cluster of
states—the remaining old Confederacy states plus Kentucky—we do observe some amount
of convergence with the national electoral cycle. In most cases (see Fig. A2), we find that
it is at about 1950 that these states’ phases reach convergence with the national phases,
especially in the 12–16 year frequency band. Interestingly, there is one exception: Louisiana
is the only one of the states in the second cluster where convergence in cycles with the
national aggregate is reached at a later point in time, at about 1970. This seems to have been
enough, however, to have brought Louisiana out of the “Deep South” cluster where, one
might argue, it originally belonged.
Presidential election returns in Ohio, which according to Table 1 is the most aligned state,
show many regions of high coherency and highly synchronized oscillations with the national
cycle.26 However, its phases reveal that Ohio’s electoral cycles have been slightly lagging the
national cycle, although it is also clear that even in that regard there has been a convergence
since mid-century. We can also identify some states that are very much synchronized for
some periods and some frequencies, but not for others. North Carolina is one such example.
In the first half of last century, there is a region of high coherency at the 27-years frequency,
while in the second half the high coherency shifts to the 12–18 year frequency. In this latter
case, one can also see that the phases are perfectly aligned with the national phase. Finally,
if one had to choose the “leader state,” that choice would fall on North Dakota, whose cycles
have persistently been leading the national cycles on both frequency bands.
Inevitably losing some detail, we can summarize the overall findings in Fig. A2 in two
ways: aggregating periods in time or aggregating states. First, we divided our observations
into two subsamples, the first running from 1896 until 1952 and the second from 1952 to
2008, i.e., using the generic turning point in terms of the “universality of political trends”
suggested by Schattschneider’s original analysis. We then computed our dissimilarity index
for each sub-sample, in order to determine the states that converged to the core and those
that did not. Figure 8 displays the variation observed from the first to the second sub-samples
25It would be too fastidious to include the coherencies and phase-differences of 45 states here. Figure A2 (in
the Appendix) shows the results for every state.
26Similar conclusions would apply to other states in the first “core” group identified in the cluster analysis,
like Michigan, Pennsylvania, Washington, New Jersey, Minnesota, and others.
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Fig. 8 Distance difference
in terms of the dissimilarity index vis-à-vis the national cycles: positive values represent an
increase in dissimilarity while negative values represent an increase in similarity. Clearly,
most states have become more synchronized with the national cycle after the 1950s than
they were in the preceding period. To test formally the hypothesis that cycles have become
generally more synchronized, one can compute the mean and the variance of the distances
in each sub-sample and perform a simple t-test against the null hypothesis that the mean is
the same in both sub-samples. This can be performed either by computing the mean of the
distances between every pair of states or computing the mean between the distance from
each state to the aggregate. In both cases, the results statistically are clear: the null of equal
means is rejected against the alternative that the mean distance has decreased, at the 1 %
significance level. In sum, from the first to the second half of the 20th century, electoral
cycles in the states have indeed become more synchronized with the national cycle.
Having said that, there are clear exceptions: Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia have
strikingly become more peripheral in the second half of the sample. If there is a tendency
towards the “universality of political trends” in presidential elections in the United States,
the evidence suggests that these four states have been mostly impervious to it.
A second way of summarizing the results is to calculate the aggregate Democratic share
of the two-party vote for the three groups of states we identified early on and estimate the
cross wavelets and phase-differences pertaining to their cycles. The three groups are formed
by the four states of the “Deep South” cluster; the “Outer South” cluster (the remaining
Southern states plus Kentucky); and the “core” states. In Fig. 9, it is clear that the Deep
South states have not approached the core, with almost no regions of coherence and messy
phase-differences, showing no sign of alignment with the core states. On the other hand,
one can see that the rest of the South has indeed converged to the core. This is particularly
evident when one looks at the phases in the 12–16 year frequency band, where coherency
becomes evident starting at about 1950.
In sum, the evidence obtained by means of wavelet analysis paints a somewhat differ-
ent picture from that presented in Schantz (1992) and Bartels (1998) concerning the timing
of greater dynamic nationalization of presidential elections. Overall, we do confirm the ex-
istence of such a change, by identifying the states in which electoral cycles have become
more in sync than in the past. But as Schattschneider suggested, the 1932 election and the
New Deal was neither the single nor necessarily the most important event to consolidate a
system where presidential election, regardless of the level of support enjoyed by each party
in a particular groups of states, became driven by common national forces across a ma-
jority of states. It is the 1950s, not the 1930s, that seem to constitute the decisive turning
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Fig. 9 Wavelet coherency core/deep South and core/South (Color figure online)
point in terms of the synchronicity in electoral cycles both among the states and between
the states and the national cycle. Important as the “revolution” of 1932 may have been,
other developments—World War II, the Cold War and how they changed the “meaning of
American politics” (Schattschneider 1960), the post-war nationalization of the news media
(Schudson 1995), and especially the Southern realignment (Nardulli 1995) and the “nation-
alization of turnout” (McDonald 2010)—seem too important not to have made a difference
in the extent to which, in spite of lingering sectional patterns, presidential elections across
the country have become driven by national forces.
Furthermore, we can see now with more precision where decisive developments driv-
ing this convergence in electoral cycles have occurred: the phase-difference between the
“core” states and most of the Southern states, particularly in the 12–16 frequency band,
starts approaching zero by the 1950s, suggesting a convergence with the electoral cycli-
cality that already characterized most of the core states. The same, however, has not oc-
curred in the Deep South, where convergence has failed to materialize in the second half
of the decade. Such a finding may seem surprising, given the prevalent notion of how
the disappearance of the Democratic “solid South,” and the ensuing party polarization in
Congress, has brought about a truly nationalized party system (Petrocik 1987; Rohde 1991;
Shafer and Johnston 2006). On the other hand, however, others have noted how politics in
the Deep South has preserved important specificities in terms of socio-demographic compo-
sition, racial attitudes, partisanship, and voting (Black and Black 2010). For example, while
it quite took longer than in the other southern states for Republican presidential candidates
to start getting a majority of the votes from white voters in the Deep South, the decline of
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the Democrats since then, both in terms of election results and party identification, has also
been more dramatic there than in the rest of the South (Valentino and Sears 2005; Hayes and
McKee 2008; Kousser 2010).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the dynamic nationalization of presidential elections in the
United States. Taking states—the natural battlegrounds of elections for an Electoral Col-
lege majority—as our basic unit of analysis, we focused on the divergence or convergence
of electoral movements across the American polity. Complementing extant research on the
geography of electoral support in the United States, we searched for patterns distinguish-
ing groups of states characterized by high and low synchronism in electoral cycles, both
among each other and with the national aggregate. Then, we analyzed trends in the extent to
which such cycles have become more or less synchronized from 1896 until today. For these
purposes, we resorted to the tools of wavelets analysis, an innovative and highly promising
approach to the study of time series data.
We found, first, that a rather meaningful division between states emerges when we look
for similarities and differences in the cyclicality of electoral returns, separating a large num-
ber of “core” states from the remaining old Confederacy states. Within the South, an addi-
tional division emerges, allowing us to identify the “Deep South states” as those that have
been characterized by electoral cycles that have remained asynchronous with the rest of the
United States and, furthermore, have shown no signs of convergence in electoral trends.
These are states that have remained impervious to the ebb and flow of electoral returns that
previous research has shown to characterize the national aggregate (Lin and Guillén 1998;
Merrill et al. 2008; Aguiar-Conraria et al. 2012a).
We also provided additional evidence concerning a rising dynamic nationalization of
politics in American elections. Schattschneider’s original argument was that the New Deal,
albeit a crucial step in the nationalization of American politics, was not a sufficient con-
dition, and had to be complemented by the accumulation of additional developments that
contributed to a greater relevance of the federal government. Others, however, have dated
the most dramatic change in this respect to the period of the New Deal and saw more modest
changes in dynamic nationalization afterwards. Our evidence, using wavelet analysis, sug-
gests that dynamic nationalization in US presidential elections seems to be, in fact, mostly
a post-war phenomenon. The fact that an important part of such stronger nationalization in
presidential electoral politics resulted from the convergence in electoral cycles in most of
the South with the national core since the 1950s suggests that the electoral realignment and
the expansion of voting rights clearly line up, in spite of the resilient uniqueness of the Deep
South, as plausible proximate causes in bringing about an increased “universality of political
trends” in presidential elections.
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